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This paper generalizes task-specific (but dissimilar) skills, from the jazz concert stage
and from the hockey field, into the domain of creativity research. What is sought are
clues to what skills or creativities are transferable across dissimilar domains. It is argued
that certain domain-general skills are transferable across domains, but a domain-general
or ‘c’ creative capacity, is not. Rather than transferring some over-arching capacity
to be universally creative, this research highlights factors likely to facilitate successful
cross-disciplinary creative expression and posits a correlation between the capacities for
discriminant pattern-recognition, task-specific expertise, and sensory data-collection,
and the transferability of creativity. Of particular significance is the capacity for informed,
selective pattern-breaking based on the ‘depth’ or ‘insider’ perspective of the domain
expert; such ‘expert variation and selective retention’ provides creative choices and
responses that are likely to be perceived by the field as creative: valuable, novel and
surprising. The author is a renowned Australian studio bassist, jazz musician, and
music educator who also plays field hockey for Australia at Masters level. His recently
completed Ph.D. thesis, based on a performance and composition career spanning
46 years, takes the form of an analytical autoethnography drawn from personal field
notes, diaries and interviews as well as published record albums.
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INTRODUCTION
Major innovations often come from individuals who are new to a field, having acquired their expertise
in an unrelated field (. . .), however, (. . .) it is only apparent in retrospect when such a cross-domain
application of knowledge will actually prove fruitful (. . .) the application of extradomain knowledge must
still undergo selection at both the individual and sociocultural levels.
(Simonton, 2015)
Following Simonton’s reminder that it is the ‘ﬁeld’ (Csikszentmihalyi, in Sternberg, 1988,
p. 325–339) that selects-as-worthy creative works, this paper addresses cross-domain application
of knowledge (or inter-disciplinary transfer of creativities), and speciﬁcally, the ‘domain-specific or
domain-general nature of creativity’ debate brought into focus by the extensive research of Baer
(1993, 1994a, 1998), Baer and Kaufman (2005) particularly his ‘Domain Speciﬁcity and the Limits
of Creativity Theory’ (Baer, 2012).
Regarding the diﬃculty in testing for general creativity (Gardner, 1993, p. 20; Baer, 1994b,c),
and in establishing whether some form of measurable general ‘c’ creativity, similar to the general
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 123
Harrison Bebop on the Hockey Pitch
‘g’ model of intelligence, actually exists (Baer, in Kaufman and
Baer, 2012, p. 321), I oﬀer some auto-ethnographic observations
(and a few distinctions) from my own inter-disciplinary career
experience. Having acquired the habitus and unique ‘insider
perspective’ of both ﬁeld hockey and jazz, a comparison of
creative practice between the two followed naturally. The
focus on jazz improvisation and ﬁeld hockey is deliberate
and pragmatic. These are two areas where I have a unique
insider perspective, and where creativity is real-time, rather than
multistage. For the purposes of this discussion, I treat.
Sawyer (2006, p. 115) posits that creative combinations often
result when people switch ﬁelds, and that these multidisciplinary
insights may be explained by analogical thinking (property
mapping and structure mapping) – allowing the individual to
perceive patterns that would not be apparent to someone working
in only one domain. Following Johnson–Laird in Sternberg
(1988), Baer (1993, p. 5) describes three kinds of creativity; real-
time; multistage; and paradigm-shifting, and it is the ﬁrst; real-
time creativity, ‘under time constraints that make performance
spontaneous, with no opportunity for revision’ that is the initial
focus of this comparison between jazz and hockey creativities.
As this research focuses speciﬁcally on real-time creativity, other
passions where I have an ‘insider perspective,’ that is, songwriting
and session/studio bass-playing, were not included as I consider
them to be forms of multistage (rather than real-time) creativity.
The inclusion of hockey in this discussion is not as unlikely as it
may at ﬁrst seem, as Weisberg acknowledges;
Athletic skills at the highest level also have creative components.
In sports such as tennis, basketball, and hockey, to name a few,
the basic activity is unstructured, and therefore requires constant
improvisation (. . .) the results from studies of musical performers
and athletes have relevance to the understanding of creative
thinking.
(Weisberg, 1993, p. 235)
It is helpful to diﬀerentiate between what sports coaches
describe as ‘closed,’ or ‘open’ skills (Poulton, 1957) with regard
to relative creativity. ‘Closed skills’ are techniques that can be
practiced without other-participant involvement (self-produced
stimuli), and are usually non-creative; the serve in tennis, free
throws in basketball, penalty-taking in hockey. ‘Open skills,’
by contrast, involves unstructured activity; reacting to other-
participant moves, plays and positioning (external stimuli),
providing multiple opportunities for creative thinking. It is in
the notion of ‘open skills’ that improvisatory creativity resides;
where the eyes, ears, brain andmuscles respond to auditory (jazz)
or visual (hockey) stimulus; visual, tactile and auditory stimuli
are cognitively represented and evaluated; the central nervous
system designs a response; and complex electrochemical signals
are passed between the nervous system and on to endocrine and
muscle systems (Pressing, 1988).
In the sporting arena, imaginative ‘plays,’ deceptive or
ambiguous body-language signals, and surprising choices, are all
part of the armory of high level athletes, especially for attacking
players where invention and surprise are eﬀective strategies
for ‘unlocking’ well-organized defenses. Useful comparisons can
be drawn between highly focused attention during ‘deliberate
practice’ of ‘closed-skills’ on the hockey pitch, and when
practicing the piano, double bass, or singing. Applying such
closed skills in the ﬁeld, ‘open-skill’ hockey matches with
unpredictable opponents, conditions and variable situations, can
similarly be compared with jazz improvisation, where immersion
over decades provides generalities, patterns recognizable to the
participants, likely outcomes, and a symbolic system of ‘triggers’
inﬂuencing behavioral responses.
. . .domains may overlap, either by having similar representations
(i.e., some mapping function exists between the representations) or
similar procedures. When this occurs, it is reasonable to expect that
skill in one domain will correlate with skill in another.
(McShane, 1991, p. 318)
The skill correlation between jazz practice and improvisatory
performance, and hockey practice and improvisatory
performance is being highlighted here. The domains, and
the speciﬁc skills or tasks required in both, are clearly dissimilar,
however, recognizable patterns and similarities exist.
Baer (1993) focused attention on a task-specific, rather than a
domain-general approach to testing and teaching for creativity;
Sternberg (1985, p. 618) found that divergent thinking tests
‘capture, at best, only the most trivial aspects of creativity’,
Plucker et al. (2004, p. 85) state ‘theorists over the past 25 years
have moved toward more inclusive models of creativity in
which divergent thinking plays an important but small role’. For
Baer, while divergent thinking theory doesn’t-test well, it has
been found to be somewhat successful for teaching creativity.
Despite being contradicted by test results, Runco’s suggestion that
ideational/divergent thinking, in the manner of Gardner’s (1983)
‘intelligences’ (Runco and Albert, 1990) is ‘certainly a step in the
right direction’, according to Baer (1993, p. 92). To that end, Baer
identiﬁes an inviting research prospect to this auto-ethnographer,
that being;
. . .the realm of matching specific skills to creative performance on
specific tasks, a large research arena which I believe some of the most
important future research in creativity will occur.
(Baer, 1993, p. 94)
This presents an intriguing possibility; if creativity is somehow
transferable, perhaps it is through similarities in mapping
functions or similar procedures; by aligning data-collection and
discriminant pattern recognition across dissimilar domains. By
observing multiple instances and possibilities for skill-matching
across domains we may induce some useful generalizations
informing the transferability of creativities.
DISCUSSION
The holy grail of creativity assessment research is a personality test
to measure general creativity ability
(Sawyer, 2006, p. 58).
Performing improvised jazz at a professional level requires a
form of musical creativity that is highly domain-specific; playing
ﬁeld hockey at an international level (similarly) requires a form
of strategic, sporting creativity that is extremely domain-specific.
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However, while hockey skills may not be directly transferable
to jazz improvisation, it is posited that certain broader, less
speciﬁc creative skills may be. This does not suggest some form
of ‘c’ or domain-general form of creativity, rather, it is posited
that pattern-recognition and response may be seen as a form
of transferable creativity. While the uninitiated may not see any
connection between the two, a creative person with expert skills
in both may connect the dots invisible to others; even beyond the
educated perception of a person inculcated in only one domain
as described by Schwandt;
“What we seek is a heightened awareness or educated perception . . .
that comes from intimate familiarity with the phenomenon”
(Schwandt, 1994).
Such a dual-domain expert, inculcated with the necessary
habitus Bourdieu (1983, p. 2), Bourdieu (1986, p. 170) in
both realms, would have the capacity to make the type of
unique, informed observations necessary to distinguish the
remotely analogous connections between such dissimilar pursuits
(Poincaré and Halsted, 1913; Mednick, 1962; Simonton, 2007;
Simonton, in Sternberg and Davidson, 1995, p. 465–494;
Weisberg, 1993, p. 93). Such a person would also have the
capacity to see commonalities and recognizable patterns that
non-experts would miss, to hypothesize circumstances in which
these patterns may be generalized and applied elsewhere, and to
theorize therefore, how such generalizations could be transferred
as domain-general creative skills.
Just as jazz band-leaders appreciate and honor the responsive
ensemble improviser on the bandstand, hockey coaches place
a high value on the player who thinks tactically on-the-run,
can execute the coach’s strategic plan, and improvise a way
out of diﬃcult pressure situations during the game. Both the
improvising jazz musician and the strategic hockey player
are collecting data (aural, and visual, respectively) as they
interact and respond to the actions of others. For the creative
practitioner in either domain, the capacity for discriminant
pattern recognition; recognizing, identifying and responding to
important stimuli from the immediate environment, either on
the bandstand, or on the hockey pitch; is signiﬁcant and highly
valued.
In the metacognitive environment of the creative jazz scenario,
the ability to recognize patterns embedded within harmonic
routines, rhythm, melodic motifs, themes, chord progressions,
and ‘licks’ is paramount. Without such ability, the musician (and
receptive audience members) would be overwhelmed at the sheer
density of musical data being presented at any given moment. As
the players encode the performance with the blues, bebop, cool,
and avant-garde traditions – the secret language and peculiar
norms of the jazz idiom – the enlightened audience, who share
a deep immersion and possess their own habitus in the jazz
sub-culture, decodes the music, appreciates, and applauds the
subtle expressions, quotes, citations, and the melodic and blues
references interwoven into the performance.
Within the elite hockey culture, certain strategies, spatial
positioning, skills, and approaches are deeply inculcated by
players to improve their individual and team performance,
and the introduction of an unfamiliar (novel or non-obvious)
domain-speciﬁc skill well-executed (useful) is often very eﬀective
to creatively dismantle a well-drilled defense (as most state and
national teams are). In creativity terms, if the striker’s visual
and kinaesthetic movements are obvious and non-creative, they
will appear to the defender as familiar, near-analogical references
(Weisberg, 1993, p. 17, 20) that ‘converge’ on the defender’s
experience, and the defender responses will be familiar, well-
rehearsed, and likely to be successful. If the movements of the
striker are, however, novel, usefully executed, and surprising
(i.e., creative) the defender must respond to remote-analogical
(Weisberg and Hass, 2007; Cunningham et al., 2009; Simonton,
2011) triggers that ‘diverge’ from the defender’s experience and
do not automatically invoke defensive patterns. (Pressing, 1988)
showed that reaction times with only one chosen motor response
fall between 100 and160 ms (. . .) whereas reaction times to
unexpected situations take up to 400 or 500 milliseconds. That
300 ms – might the diﬀerence between eliminating a defender
(or not) and scoring (or not scoring), a goal. So is there some
comparable capacity for pattern recognition that manifests itself
in the jazz ensemble?
Parallels exist in the jazz improvisatory realm, where, based
on my own experience working as a bassist with the cream of
Australian jazz performers, a signiﬁcant part of the function of
a jazz bassist is to provide harmonic, rhythmic, and melodic
support for the singer, soloist, and other accompanists on the
jazz bandstand. Well-chosen creative responses to a soloist’s
performance can provide the platform to propel an otherwise-
unremarkable jazz solo into an engaging one. The ability to
anticipate what those musicians expect, desire, or need to hear
from the bass instrument at any given moment is what separates
a great bassist from a poor one; well-rehearsed motor responses
are much faster than signiﬁcant voluntary compensations; the
reaction times of the highly trained bassist to the “introduced
novelties of improvising players” (Pressing, 1988), are much
faster than those of the less-trained bassist. This use of pattern
recognition (based upon aural data-collection) to inform musical
choices allows the jazz bassist to please fellow musicians, singers
and the audience. Sometimes it is providing patterns (bass ‘riﬀs’)
that are pleasing because of their predictability. Sometimes it is
breaking patterns for surprise, color, delaying the expectations
of the audience, or creating tension and release. Sometimes it is
simply being cognisant of the patterns, with no action taken.
Similarly, the use of pattern recognition (based upon visual
data-collection) to inform sporting choices allows the elite
hockey player to support fellow athletes, coaches and fans by
executing patterns (oﬀ-the-ball actions) that are eﬀective because
of their strategic predictability. Sometimes it is breaking patterns
for surprise, deception, confounding the expectations of the
opposition, or creating goal-scoring opportunities. Sometimes
it is simply being cognisant of the patterns, with no action
taken (merely ‘holding’ a key opposition defender away from the
anticipated play).
Whilst the task-speciﬁc activities involved in bass-playing and
ﬁeld hockey then are very diﬀerent, and domain-speciﬁcity is
clearly evident, the activities are near-analogous in that they both
use pattern recognition (and pattern deception) to inﬂuence the
audience (or opposition). What is generalizable and transferable
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across disciplines then is a capacity for data-collection and
pattern-recognition, facilitated by expert habitus in both ﬁelds.
IMPLICATIONS
It is unsurprising that the transfer of domain-specific creativity
tends to be more prevalent in related domains than in unrelated
ones. If one has achieved a high skill level through directed
study in one domain, then many of the same skills will obviously
facilitate creativity in the near-analogous situations of a related
discipline. Dissimilar domains provide an opportunity to look
at what can be transferred when task-speciﬁc skills have little in
common. Due to this unique dual-domain perspective, when a
person with expertise across two very diﬀerent ﬁelds of endeavor
does manage to transfer skills across unrelated disciplines, it
is likely that the resultant creative products or propulsions
will be diﬀerent somehow. Following Sternberg et al.’s (2002)
Propulsion Theory of Creativity,” the type of Advanced Forward
Incrementation, Synthesis, or other propulsions that reject or
challenge ‘where we are now’ come into play, rather than
the more common Forward Incrementation and other creative
propulsions that accept ‘where we are now’. Skills possessed
across unrelated disciplines precipitate more divergent, remote-
analogical solutions than those convergent solutions implied by
closely related, domain-speciﬁc transfers.
However, without a willingness and preparedness to
use divergent thinking methods like blind variation and
selective retention (BVSR) including trial and error or random
experimentation and a degree of risk-taking (Campbell, 1960;
Simonton, 2011), thinking will tend to be convergent and
propulsions will tend to be of the forward incrementation variety;
resulting in creativity unlikely to be considered by the ﬁeld as
paradigm shifting. The hockey player becomes predictable, the
jazz improviser’s playing somewhat stale, and the songwriter’s
artifacts popular, but unremarkable. It is posited that a highly
skilled, deeply immersed dual-domain expert might apply their
unique multidisciplinary habitus in a form of ‘expert’ variation
and selective retention (EVSR) where experience allows a
form of discriminant pattern recognition unavailable to lesser
songwriters. From this informed EVSR perspective, trial and
error, risk-taking and solution-seeking is much more likely to be
successful than the random choices of a novice whose variations
are ‘blind’; successful creative outcomes are not simply guess-
work, they are inﬂuenced by expert habitus, ‘intuitive feelings of
warmth’, and substantial prior trial and error.
CONCLUSION
As Simonton suggests, persons with expert skills in at least two
areas are simply more likely to make the unique distinctions
that less expert, less inter-disciplined persons cannot, and
thereby discover what is transferable. Returning to the question
posed in the introduction; ‘What skills or creativities are
transferable across dissimilar domains’, it is posited that on
both the bebop bandstand and the hockey ﬁeld, data collection
and discriminant pattern-recognition are signiﬁcant. Based on
aural or visual input stimuli, the capacity to recognize and
support, match, complement, or break patterns, responding
in the context of the encoded habitus of the domain to
desirable eﬀect, represents a transferable creativity. It is
possible that this type of creativity transfer may have wider
applications, that is, beyond merely jazz improvisation and
team sports, where, for example, the capacity to collect visual
data and use discriminant pattern-recognition in the ﬁeld
of architecture may be used in the auditory data realm of
sound mixing in the recording studio. Or, during a motor
race, a highly skilled driver may use an acutely developed
sense of auditory pattern recognition to identify nuances of
race-car performance (based on the sound of the engine or
tires) to inform, conﬁrm or refute the pit-crew’s analysis of
visual computer data. Alternately, that same race-driver may
‘creatively’ overtake another driver (having observed their driving
patterns and invented a non-obvious overtaking sequence that
is diﬃcult to ‘defend’). While a world-champion race driver
or an expert sound-mixer (with substantial commercial capital
at stake) might be reluctant to disclose (under interview)
their capacity to transfer creativity in such a way, such
disclosure (if given) may provide further evidence in support
of this perspective. Furthermore, the capacity to generalize
and subsequently transfer domain-general skills across domains,
the realm of the ﬁeld shifter or multidisciplinary expert, may
be one factor that stimulates the creative person to explore
propulsions that reject or challenge the current paradigm, by
introducing fruitfully asynchronous, remotely analogous ideas
that (if accepted by the ﬁeld as worthy) are seen to be highly
creative.
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